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Abstract 
The term Open Innovation has become popular in recent  years to describe 
an approach to innovation that decidedl y goes beyond the boundaries of a  
single organization by encouraging firms to pull tog ether knowledge and 
creativity from a wide variety of parties. As such, Open Innovation evokes 
an image of firms working with a multitude of partners, always searching 
for new linkages that could enhance their innovative potential, or  for the 
highest bidders for knowledge that they may wish to sell – in short, this is a 
“swingers club” of firms engaged in innovation. Yet, drawing on resourced 
based view, absorptive capacity, and other concepts, we propose that firms, 
even when practicing Open Innovation, will not be all that open – rathe r, 
they will “go steady” with a more limited number of partners. To explore 
the microstructure of  “openness” we develop a  number of hypotheses for 
which we find general support in proprietary survey data from Spain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Open innovation ￿ as commonly conceived ￿ should strike one as a proposition to dance 
on many parties and to exchange partners frequently ￿ in other words, a ￿swinger￿s club￿. Yet, is 
that really what we should expect? Or is the truth (both, in terms of what firms actually do and 
what would be optimal for them) much closer to a conventional ￿going steady￿ relationship? 
This is the key question for our paper. We will go about addressing this question by contrasting 
central ideas from the literature on open innovation with key concepts from other literatures, and 
by providing empirical results from data that we have recently collected in Spain. 
Open innovation, according to the basic characterization one finds in the literature 
(Chesbrough, 2004, 2006a,b; Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West, 2006) consists of a vastly 
different concept of innovation than that expressed in the received proprietary or ￿closed￿ 
innovation model. Open innovation, in fact, is supposed to generate extra value by ￿opening￿ the 
internal innovation process to both inflows of external knowledge and outflows of internal 
knowledge or technologies that have greater value outside of the firm. This value generation 
prescription, however, essentially implies that external knowledge should be sourced from 
wherever the best knowledge currently resides; likewise, internal knowledge that has little value 
within the firm should be sold to the highest external bidder. Both of these processes would 
therefore ideally entail ￿broad search￿ (in the learning literature, the analogue would be a 
cognitive search strategy that attempts to identify an optimum target across the whole market 
space, rather than just focusing on search in the ￿neighborhood￿ of one￿s existing position ￿ see, 
e.g., the specification in Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) ￿ in other words, in order to find the best 
current knowledge or the highest bidder, the whole market should be scanned, as there is little 
rationale to expect that these entities are among the current set of exchange partners a firm deals 
with. Yet, our contention is that a variety of organizational processes, from simple inertia, pure 
convenience or bounded rationality, to game theoretic considerations that arise from the very 
attempt to pursue open innovation, suggest that in actuality such search is much less broad and 
could rather be described as ￿neighborhood search￿ or simply ￿going steady￿. Identifying which 
set-up would actually be optimal, and what is actual current practice, is obviously of high current 
importance for managers, policy makers, and academics alike. Some of the latter are currently 
working on the implications of inter-organizational collaboration on research and development, 
and our theory should contribute to this line of inquiry; executives, on the other hand, are trying 
to derive value from an open innovation approach, and it is our task as researchers to reflect on 
their practices and identify whether current practices are value generating or not and what could 
be done to improve them. Policy makers, finally, are striving to prepare the foundations for an 
ongoing competitiveness of their respective domain. A prominent example of the latter are the 
various technology programs (across several industries) that Tekes, the Finnish Funding Agency 
for Technology and Innovation (Tekes, 2005), has launched in recent years in order to foster co-
operation between research institutes, universities and industry.  
This paper is organized as follows ￿ after a brief review of the applicable literature, we 
develop our model of the influences that shape the form that open innovation will take within 
firms. We then test our model on a proprietary data set that is based on a survey that we have 
recently executed in Spain. IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                            05-02-2008
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THEORY 
The basic idea of the emerging open innovation paradigm, as suggested above, is that 
firms open their boundaries to an inflow of externally available knowledge, as well as an outflow 
of internal knowledge that may have more value when applied outside of the inventing firm 
(Chesbrough, 2004, 2006a,b; Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke & West, 2006).  As, for instance, 
Chesbrough (2006a) has described, especially opportunities for sourcing or ￿buying￿ external 
knowledge have increased dramatically due to the broader availability of skilled personnel in the 
economy (e.g., because of more training through universities, or the existence of outside labor 
markets for such personnel that allows firms to tap into a large pool of such laborers, etc.), and 
particularly the rise of venture capital that gives such skilled personnel an outside option to apply 
their ideas and thus fosters the creation of new firms with high standards of technology in many 
industries (see also Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001). This proliferation of knowledge 
means that the traditional, closed innovation practices of large firms can no longer claim a 
knowledge monopoly in their areas of expertise (Chesbrough, 2006a). Procter & Gamble, for 
instance, has realized that while it employs several thousand scientists itself, its suppliers, 
customers, competitors and other institutions together employ more than a million persons doing 
research in P&G￿s core markets (Huston & Sakkab, 2006). Hence, it becomes increasingly 
unlikely that the best ideas are created in your own lab ￿ incentive enough to actively pursue new 
ideas that are created by other market participants and that could be integrated into one￿s own 
product offerings. 
Similarly, internal R&D oftentimes produces results that cannot be used in a focal firm￿s 
current business model. If such ￿surplus￿ inventions just sit on the shelve, the risk is that others 
capitalize on such inventions, without any benefit accruing to the focal firm. These others, may, 
for instance, even be engineers of the focal firm itself who, with venture capital backing, strike 
out on their own. The many path-breaking inventions that came out of Xerox￿s Palo Alto 
Research Center, but that were brought to market by other firms is a famous example 
(Chesbrough 2006a). Hence, the open innovation prescription is that instead of protecting 
intellectual property ￿at all cost￿, firms should actively seek buyers for their surplus technologies 
in order to realize some of the potential value that these technologies may have when combined 
with another firm￿s resource base and business model. Altogether, open innovation thus stands 
for openness in two directions ￿ an inflow (buying) of external knowledge that can help the firm 
to innovate more effectively and efficiently, and an outflow (selling) of internal knowledge that 
has a higher value when combined with another firm￿s business. Yet, to derive the highest value 
out of these concepts it appears as though firms should always search for the best available 
knowledge wherever it is located, or for the highest bidders wherever they may be. In other 
words, firms should search the market broadly and not restrict themselves to choosing among a 
particular pre-existing set of exchange partners; rather, partner selection should be essentially 
random and changing. Overall, this characterization of the potential benefits and resulting 
incentives to pursue ￿open innovation￿ suggest that firms that want to make optimal use of the 
potentials of external knowledge or the sale of surplus technologies, should act like ￿swingers￿:  
Hypothesis 1: Firms practicing open innovation (buy or sell) will tend to use different 
partners over time, rather than develop a network of specific exchange partners. 
Yet, several ideas from other literatures, like the resource based view, transaction costs or 
game theory, suggest that additional factors also impact the economics of innovation and may IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                            05-02-2008
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thus lead to a tradeoff between broad partner selection and the development of a more specific 
partner network. In other words, while a ￿broad search￿ may be valuable in terms of identifying 
the ￿best￿ knowledge that is currently available, or the highest bidder for surplus inventions a 
firm may try to sell, other factors may make it again more valuable (or more desirable) to work 
with a narrower set of partners, or, in other words, to ￿go steady￿. Laursen and Salter￿s (2006) 
recent finding that firms who have open search strategies tend to be more innovative, but that 
there is a point where additional search becomes unproductive, is an example that suggests that 
such tradeoffs indeed seem to exist. 
Basic concepts of the resource based view (e.g., Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Peteraf, 1993), the interorganizational capabilities view (Dyer & Singh, 1998), and absorptive 
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), in particular, combine to suggest an important reason for 
limiting partner selection to a narrower group. Specifically, to actually benefit from external 
knowledge requires that such knowledge is properly understood and can be integrated with 
existing internal capabilities to create a new productive combination. At the very least, this 
process assures that the firm can make use of external knowledge to produce a product that may 
also be offered by others; at best, a customization of external knowledge by integration with 
valuable and rare resources that the firm already commands may generate a unique product that, 
even though part of the knowledge is externally sourced, is difficult to imitate or substitute. For 
the sell side, i.e., the offering of internal knowledge to external partners, the situation is similar 
since the extent to which the external partner is capable of understanding and integrating the 
focal firm￿s knowledge into its own resource base is vital for the value that that partner will 
associate with the knowledge on offer, and hence for the price that the offering firm can realize. 
Accordingly, the existence of prior related knowledge, or ￿absorptive capacity￿ (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990), which allows the firm to recognize valuable external knowledge and to 
integrate the same, is critical for the success of both sides of the open innovation paradigm, i.e., 
the buying of external technologies, and the selling of internal surplus knowledge (in the latter 
case, it is actually the absorptive capacity that the other party has built up that becomes critical). 
Underscoring the importance of absorptive capacity, Laursen and Salter (2005), for instance, find 
that firms with high levels of absorptive capacity (particularly skills and access to external 
networks) are likely to be more open. Yet, the more specific the absorptive capacity is to the new 
knowledge in question, the better recognition and integration should function. In this context, it 
seems intuitive that the more often a certain dyad of firms interacts, the more they understand 
each other and can relate to each others￿ R&D; thus, further transfers will function more 
smoothly and innovations can proceed faster and more effectively. Dyer and Singh (1998), in 
their work on competitive advantage creation in alliances, suggest, in fact, that repeated 
interactions between firms produce the potential for the creation of an alliance specific 
competitive advantage. This is partly due to the development of ￿partner specific absorptive 
capacity￿ that depends a) on the development of overlapping knowledge bases (a precondition 
for ￿understanding￿ each other in Cohen and Levinthal￿s, 1990, original conceptualization of 
absorptive capacity), and b) the development of ￿interaction routines that maximize the 
frequency and intensity of sociotechnical interactions￿ (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 663-665). With 
regard to the latter, Dyer and Singh (1998) specifically emphasize the importance of human asset 
specificity (e.g., the development of a common language, etc.), which is developed through long-
standing interactions. IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                            05-02-2008
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Yet, if a firm￿s absorptive capacity is stronger with respect to certain partners, then those 
open innovation opportunities that the firm relatively better understands should actually have a 
higher value to the firm, as it can reduce the costs associated with searching for knowledge or 
exchange partners and/or more efficiently or effectively integrate the knowledge into its own 
resource base. If, as the foregoing arguments suggest, absorptive capacity is higher with respect 
to external partners whom the focal firm has interacted with before, then this would imply that 
further interactions with this same group of partners have a higher value than interactions with 
other potential, but unknown, partners. Selecting to work with such extant partners will then tend 
to further enhance such specific absorptive capacity and thus make it even more likely that the 
same partner is selected in the future. As a result, an approach to open innovation is likely to 
create a microstructure of interactions that lead to the development of islands of strong ties 
within particular networks of firms within a sea of much looser ties. Hence, our basic proposition 
is essentially the opposite of hypothesis 1, i.e., that partner selection is not random, but specific 
and repetitive: 
Hypothesis 2: In acquiring external or selling internal knowledge or technologies, firms that 
practice open innovation will prefer to work with a specific set of partners, rather than 
searching for new partners every time. 
Yet, another explanation for finding the pattern suggested in hypothesis 2 is that firms 
may simply suffer from ￿inertia￿, and thus tend to resist frequent changes and to continue with a 
once chosen pattern of action (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Accordingly, a partner, once 
selected, will be interacted with again and again. Since inertia results from a variety of factors 
like bureaucratic or mechanistic organizational structures (Burns & Stalker, 1961), complexity, 
encrusted internal political structures, and so on, which in general seem to increase with firm size 
and particularly age (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), a reasonable assumption would therefore be 
that if inertia is behind a ￿going steady￿ behavior, then such effects should be more pronounced 
for older and larger firms: 
Hypothesis 3: The older and larger a firm, the more it will tend to repeat transactions with 
the same partners. 
A further refinement to our view of the microstructure of relations that firms engaged in 
open innovation create comes from the consideration of the transaction costs (Williamson, 1979) 
of searching for and contracting with the provider or receiver of a particular piece of knowledge. 
The issue of search costs has essentially been dealt with above in the sense that the existence of 
partner-specific absorptive capacity, to utilize Dyer and Singh￿s term again, should lead to a 
reduction in these costs and thus tend to make partner selection from a pool of known exchange 
partners comparatively more valuable. However, the question of how exchanges between 
partners are governed is likely to further affect how firms will chose who to work with in a given 
knowledge buy or sell situation.  
Dyer & Singh (1998), for example, argue that effective governance in alliances 
encourages transparency, discourages free-riding, and increases incentives to create value, and 
includes, besides formal third party or trust based governance, also hostage based safeguards to 
assure that knowledge is not given to others or replicated. In an open innovation setting where 
knowledge that is ￿sold￿ may travel beyond the confines of an alliance and into entities that are IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                            05-02-2008
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not connected to the provider of the knowledge, such safeguards may take on particular 
importance, although their main task may not necessarily be to ensure that the knowledge is not 
replicated or shared with yet others. In fact, to the extent that the selling firm does not even use 
the knowledge in its own production set (a real ￿surplus￿ invention), the further proliferation of 
that knowledge may be less of an issue to the selling firm than the concern that the acquiring 
firm stands to gain substantially from applying that knowledge. As a result, the focal firm may 
hesitate to actually provide the knowledge lest it may loose out on the future value of it. This is 
similar to market failures that occur due to the problem of demonstrating and thus giving away 
tacit knowledge assets (e.g., Arrow, 1964, 1996), and may be ameliorated by a choice of a 
governance mechanism (e.g., joint venture, merger ￿ e.g., Williamson, 1979) that aligns interests 
by allowing both firms to share in the benefits from the eventual application of the knowledge. 
Another way to overcome this problem may be to reciprocally exchange information (of perhaps 
about similar ex-ante value) and thus to create a situation that provides positive options for both 
parties. This is a more game theoretic approach of finding a mutually agreeable equilibrium of 
providing vs. not providing information ￿ essentially, a way of creating commitments to enforce 
a beneficial situation where both firms collaborate by creating a climate of cooperation through 
the underlying exchange of hostages. Procter & Gamble, for instance, does seem to rely on 
reciprocal information sharing in many of its most successful open innovation projects (Huston 
& Sakkab, 2006). Similarly, reciprocal knowledge exchanges are often institutionalized in joint 
ventures and similar equity partnerships (Kogut, 1989). Such a quid pro quo should be the more 
important the more a firm is actually engaged in an open innovation approach. Hence, we 
propose: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms following an open innovation approach will procure (sell) knowledge 
from (to) those external market participants that they have already sold (procured) 
knowledge to (from). 
METHODS 
We test our hypotheses with data that comes from a recent survey on innovation practices 
in Spain, which itself is part of a larger effort to collect empirical evidence on the proliferation of 
open innovation concepts and the actual use of different types of innovative concepts in the 
economies of a number of countries, including Finland, Russia, and China. The present survey 
was conducted in Spain in late November and early December of 2007 by using two waves of 
emails and a web-based survey instrument. To ensure a high response rate, as well as to comply 
with Spanish privacy laws, the initial list of addressees was drawn from the alumni database of a 
leading Spanish business school. This database consists of email addresses of former students of 
Masters or Executive Education programs who have given prior permission to receive email, and 
contains additional data on employer firms, positions, and responsibilities. Applying a number of 
filters, we selected a sample of 2105 addresses of persons who are currently employed in higher 
management positions in Spanish firms. A cover letter in Spanish, which briefly explained the 
purpose of the study and offered a summary of results as ￿reward￿ was accompanied by a short 
letter of the Dean of the business school, encouraging the alumnis to participate. Two weeks 
after the first letter, a reminder letter with a similar content and another link to the survey web-
page was sent out to all addressees that had not responded to the first mailing. Altogether, 131 
usable responses were received, for a response rate of 6.2%. The survey responses cover the 
whole spectrum of the Spanish economy, with a particular emphasis on the service and the IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                         05-02-2008
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manufacturing sector. Likewise, all sizes of firms are represented in the sample with non-
negligible numbers of firms in each size-category. 
The questionnaire itself was designed in a straightforward way in order to collect 
primarily factual information on basic firm demographics, practices with respect to acquiring 
external knowledge, practices with respect to the selling of internally generated knowledge into 
the external market, and, finally, practices and experiences regarding research collaboration with 
other firms and public institutions. Most questions are phrased in a direct way and offer 
respondents several choices to indicate how their firm acts with respect to a specific issue. 
Several questions also ask the respondents to rank answers in terms of their importance.  
For the current paper, a number of specific questions were inserted in the sections on 
acquiring and selling knowledge. These, as well responses to a number of the other questions and 
the demographic information form the basis for the following empirical analysis. The appendix 
provides an English version of the particular questions that are used in this paper.  
VARIABLES 
The survey responses have been converted into a number of variables that will be used to 
construct a rigorous test of the various hypotheses. These variables are explained in the 
following with reference to the question numbers that appeared in the original survey (see 
appendix). 
Specific Partner Choice is our primary dependent variable and is modeled as a dummy 
variable that takes on the value of one if firms have indicated that they either prefer to work with 
a specific set of partners, or that they always work with the same partners, and zero if they 
indicated that they work with random partners every time. This variable is defined separately for 
￿buying￿ external knowledge (Specific Partner Choice BUY; based on question 23), and for 
￿selling￿ knowledge to others (Specific Partner Choice SELL; based on question 35). 
Open Innovation Reported is a dummy set to one if respondents indicated in their 
response to question 42 that they believe that they are applying an ￿open innovation￿ model in 
their company, and to zero otherwise. 
Open Innovation Implied is a dummy variable that attempts to capture from the answers 
to questions 9 and 26 the degree of buy or sell side ￿openness￿. As for specific partner choice, 
the variable is separately defined for buy (OI implied BUY) and sell side (OI implied Sell) and 
set to one if respondents indicated in question 9 that they sometimes acquire external 
technologies or that the utilization of external technologies (and knowledge) is vital to their 
business, and if they indicated in question 26 either that surplus technologies emerge 
unavoidably, or that the development of such technologies is core to their business model, 
respectively. In addition, a third dummy variable (OI implied Buy & Sell) is set to one if both, 
the sell and the buy dummy are one, and zero otherwise. 
Reciprocal Dealings Reported is a dummy variable set to one if the firm responded to 
question 36 that they sometimes or often provide technology to firms from whom they have 
sourced technology, and to zero otherwise. 
Age is simply calculated as the year 2007 minus the founding year that was reported in 
the questionnaire. 
Size is modeled as a series of six dummy variables to reflect the employee-based size 
classes that were offered to respondents in the questionnaire (see appendix). Size classes include 
very small,  small,  lower medium, medium,  upper medium, and large, with the very small 
dummy being excluded from the regressions. IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                            05-02-2008
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We also include self-reported R&D intensity (an ordinal scale with 5 levels) as a control 
variable in all models. Table 1 offers basic statistics and correlations for the variables used in the 
regressions. 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
ESTIMATION APPROACH 
Since our main dependent variable is dichotomous, we are primarily employing a logistic 
regression model to test our hypotheses. The main model is of the form: 
  PartnerChoicei = β Xi + β 2Opennessi + β 3Agei + β 3Sizei + ui (1) 
Where PartnerChoice is either the variable Specific Partner Choice (BUY or SELL) as 
discussed above (assessing whether partner choice is random or not), or the variable Reciprocal 
Dealings Reported (assessing whether buy and sell activities are carried out with the same 
partners), and Openness, Age and Size are the key independent variables of interest, as explained 
above, X are other observed firm variables that may influence firm environmental performance, 
specifically the R&D intensity variable, and u, finally, accounts for any remaining unobserved 
firm characteristics that may also affect the dependent variable. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In addressing our first two, competing hypotheses regarding the specificity or 
randomness of partner selection, it is illustrative to first take a look at the raw data of responses 
to our two specific questions regarding partner specificity (questions 23 and 35 ￿ see appendix). 
Of all the persons that responded to question 23 (partner specificity in BUY situations), 21% 
indicated that they work with random partners every time, but three times as many (65%) stated 
that they prefer to work with a specific set of partners, and an additional six percent even claimed 
to always work with the exact same partners. Similarly, for question 35 (partner specificity in 
SELL situations), 20% of respondents indicated a random partner selection, 53% a preference for 
a specific set of partners, and 12% a reliance on the exact same partners. Thus, both for 
knowledge buy and sell situations, the vast majority of firms apparently relies on a rather specific 
network of external partners to exchange knowledge with, rather than trying to maximize the 
potential value of sourced or sold knowledge by scanning the entire market and engaging in 
essentially random partnerships. This is first evidence in support of our hypothesis 2 and clearly 
inconsistent with hypothesis 1. 
Yet, in order to provide a more rigorous test of these two competing hypothesis, we need 
to identify the exact role that open innovation concepts play in these reported tendencies of 
partnering. Specifically, both hypotheses suggest that firms that explicitly embrace an open 
innovation concept and therefore actively attempt to generate value by sourcing external 
knowledge and/or selling their own, should be the ones that are either more open to random 
partnerships (hypothesis 1) or more prone to create a very specific microstructure of partnership 
interactions (hypothesis 2). Thus, we need to relate measures of the degree to which a firm 
follows an open innovation paradigm to their partnership structure in order to either find proper 
support or reject these hypotheses. We therefore apply the logistic model described above and 
relate the degree of partner specificity for either the knowledge BUY or SELL side to our 
different measures of openness and the various other variables discussed above as controls. Table 
2 reports the resulting parameter estimates, standard deviations and significance levels. 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                            05-02-2008
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As is apparent from the results in table 2, respondents that self-report that their firms 
indeed apply an open innovation paradigm (captured in the variable Open Innovation Reported) 
do not appear to be significantly more or less likely to engage in specific partner selection than 
others in either knowledge buy or sell situations. While both parameter estimates are negative 
and thus in line with the prediction of hypothesis 2 (please note that the probability modeled is 
that of no specific partner choice ￿ hence, the negative signs are indicative of less random and 
more specific choices made by firms), there is a complete absence of statistical significance for 
these estimates. However, for our second set of proxies for openness, which use the responses to 
questions regarding actual firm behavior in buy and sell situations rather than a response to a 
direct, self-reflective question in order to determine whether a firm follows an open innovation 
approach, we find a much stronger result. Especially the variable OI implied BUY and SELL, 
which combines the responses regarding behavior in buy and sell situations (and thus only 
reports that a firm is ￿open￿ if both, the response to the buy and the sell situation question 
indicate openness for that respective situation), shows a very strong statistical association with 
specific partner choice both for buy and sell situations. Since in both of these cases the rather 
substantial and highly significant parameter estimates of this explanatory variable are negative, 
(thus indicating more specific partner choices), we interpret this finding as substantial support for 
our hypothesis 2 and the underlying argument that the build-up of partner specific experience 
and particularly absorptive capacity, and the resulting economies of repeatedly selecting and 
working with a small network of partners, appears to outweigh the potential benefits that a broad 
search among unknown partners could have in an open innovation context. Accordingly, our 
results compel us to reject hypothesis 1, which was explicitly based on the idea that a broad 
search, unrestricted by current partnership ties, will reveal the most promising new technologies 
or located the highest bidders for internal surplus knowledge, and thus outweigh efficiencies 
from staying with current partners. Hence, according to our results, firms engaged in open 
innovation do seem to ￿go steady￿, rather than acting like ￿swingers￿ and dancing on many 
different parties. 
The final two models in table 2 include as explanatory variables separately both the 
reported degree of openness in buy (OI implied BUY) and in sell situations (OI implied SELL). 
For these models, we note that a reported openness in knowledge sell situations (OI implied 
SELL) has very similar effects on specific partner choice in both, sell and buy situations, as the 
combined measure used above, i.e., a large negative and highly significant parameter estimate 
that supports hypothesis 2 and rejects hypothesis 1. Yet, the corresponding measure of openness 
in buy situations (OI implied BUY) shows no significant link to partner choice in either situation. 
Our interpretation of these divergent results is that a self reported openness in terms of 
knowledge acquisition is not a very surprising response to receive from firms, as it is reasonably 
intuitive, and, furthermore, a concept that has been around for quite a while that an integration of 
external knowledge may help the focal firm to succeed. However, being open in terms of also 
allowing others to access one￿s own knowledge may require more of a stretch of the imagination, 
and, in any case, a more dramatic departure from the ￿closed innovation￿ paradigm whose 
cornerstone was the protection and harboring of internally generated knowledge (e.g., 
Chesbrough, 2006a). 
Accordingly, reporting openness in acquiring knowledge may not necessarily be 
indicative of a strong open innovation approach and thus reduce the ability of this proxy to 
capture the hypothesized relationship between an open innovation policy and specific partner IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                          05-02-2008
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selection. Similarly, answering a question whether your firm is implementing an open innovation 
approach (captured in Open Innovation Reported) may carry a strong social desirability self-
reporting bias (e.g., Paulhus, 1991) ￿ to the extent that open innovation is currently being touted 
as the next new wave of good management practices (see, e.g., Huston & Sakkab￿s 2006 Harvard 
Business Review article), firms may over-report being ￿open￿ and thus again reduce the ability 
of this proxy to find the hypothesized effect. Being open in sell situations, however, should be 
seen as a much stronger statement that a firm is already embracing the open innovation 
paradigm; similarly, finding that firms are open in both, buy and sell situations, should likewise 
be a rather strong indicator that the ideas of open innovation have permeated the focal firm￿s 
actions. Since it is for the latter two proxies that we find strong results in accordance with 
hypothesis 2, we are quite confident in our results. 
Furthermore, we can also use the results reported in table 2 to address the third 
hypothesis regarding the question of whether inertia, rather than the capability of working with 
known partners, is the primary reason for the pattern of specific partner choices that we have just 
identified. Specifically, as we have argued above, age and size, two variables that we have 
collected in our survey and included in the regressions in table 2, are generally considered to be 
correlated with firm inertia (e.g., Słrensen & Stuart, 2000). While these are crude measures of 
this complex issue, we use them here because they do appear to be a good first proxy for the 
existence of inertia, and because we were able to collect this information from our respondents. 
As table 2 shows, in no specification is there any indication that either older or larger firms are 
particularly prone to a specific partner selection. Hence, we conclude that, based on the crude 
proxies age and size, there is no evidence that the specificity of partner selection is caused by 
inertia, refuting hypothesis 3. Instead, it appears quite likely that the specificity of partner 
selection is due to the capability based arguments discussed above. 
Finally, we turn to the results concerning hypothesis 4, which can be found in table 3. 
Looking again at raw responses first, we find that 70% of respondents do not engage in 
reciprocal dealings by sourcing knowledge from partners who they have sold knowledge to, or 
vice versa. Yet, 27% profess to undertake reciprocal dealings sometimes, and an additional 3% 
report frequent interactions of this kind. Overall, a majority of respondents apparently does not 
see virtue in, or simply has not yet applied the idea of exchanging knowledge hostages in order 
to facilitate the overall exchange of knowledge as suggested in hypothesis 4. 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
While these initial results thus seem at odds with our hypothesis, we again need to isolate 
the effect of actually applying open innovation concepts. As proposed, firms that explicitly 
attempt to wring value out of an application of the prescription of the open innovation paradigm 
by increasing the buying and selling of knowledge, should be in a situation where they feel a 
more pressing need for governance elements that enable a smooth function of these interchanges. 
Supporting this contention, all three models in table 3 report highly significant and relative large 
effects of the various proxies of an open innovation approach on employing reciprocity with 
respect to knowledge exchanges with the same partners (again, the probability modeled is that 
there is no reciprocity, and the negative signs thus indicate increasing degrees of reciprocal 
dealings). Like in the earlier set of regressions, the implied (as opposed to self-reported) 
measures of open innovation show a very strong association with reciprocal dealings, with the 
exception of the proxy for being open in buy situations (OI implied BUY), which we believe is 
due to the same reason as discussed above. However, in contrast to the first set of regressions, we IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                           05-02-2008
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now also find a strong and highly significant relation between the self-reported measure of 
openness and reciprocal dealings in the direction predicted by hypothesis 4. It thus appears as 
though this self-reported variable does serve as a proxy for openness, albeit as a weak one as 
indicated by the prior results, where the correct directionality was found in results that failed to 
reach statistically significance. Yet, if this weak proxy finds a clear relation between openness 
and reciprocal exchange of knowledge, it appears as though the need for reciprocal dealings is 
indeed quite strong in firms subscribing to the open innovation paradigm. 
CONCLUSION 
Open Innovation has already become an important concept that is being used by firms 
like Intel, Procter & Gamble, Nokia or Philips (e.g., Chesbrough, 2006a, Huston & Sakkab, 
2006) to boost their innovative capacity. In this paper, we have taken a look at the question of 
how ￿open￿ such open innovation really is or ought to be. Specifically, we have suggested that 
contrary to a straightforward interpretation of openness as implying that firms scan the entire 
market in their search for useful new knowledge or buyers for their own surplus technologies, 
and the resulting behavior of engaging in many different and changing partnerships with other 
firms over time (the ￿swingers￿ club￿), there may be considerable virtue in ￿going steady￿ and 
focusing on interactions within a more limited specific network of partners. The logic is simply 
one of economic tradeoffs ￿ broad search is more likely than limited search to uncover really 
novel, and/or really valuable ideas, while concentrating on repeated interactions with existing 
partners is likely to lead to a build-up of partner specific capabilities that, in turn, facilitate an 
effective and efficient transfer of knowledge and make finding new partners more easy to begin 
with. Drawing on recent survey data from Spain, we were indeed able to find significant support 
for our thesis. Moreover, our results have also allowed us to reject inertia as an alternative 
explanation for why open innovation firms may pursue a strategy of working with specific 
partners. 
While our data does not allow us to link these observed practices of partner selection to 
firm profitability, the indication clearly is that firms perceive a more specific partner choice as 
superior to an unbounded search, even when pursuing an explicit open innovation strategy, 
suggesting further need for academics to refine our understanding of this concept and its 
implications. The tradeoffs described here between broad and narrow partner selection, however, 
may also have an important implication for the resulting nature of innovation. To the extent that 
a broader search is likely to uncover more novel possibilities than a reliance on repeated 
interactions with the same partners, the ￿going steady￿ reality that seems to prevail even (or 
especially) for firms subscribing to an open innovation paradigm may tend to shift innovation 
away from an ￿exploration￿ of completely new ideas and towards more ￿exploitation￿ of 
existing concepts and (March, 1991). Thus, open innovation could paradoxically actually lead to 
a lower degree of really path-breaking innovation, at least in the long run ￿ a concern that would 
seem to be rather important for firms as well as policy makers intent on encouraging innovation. 
Hence, these tradeoffs and the non-intuitive implications that open innovation seems to have on 
the balance between exploitation and exploration clearly warrant further study. 
Furthermore, we have also suggested that in addition to dealing with a specific set of 
partners, firms will also engaged in both, buy and sell transaction with individual exchange 
partners in order to create an environment of trust by having reciprocal interests in each others￿ 
knowledge. Also this hypothesis was strongly supported, indicating that among open innovation 
firms, reciprocity could be seen as a best practice. IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                            05-02-2008
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Overall, our results essentially suggest that ￿openness￿ may be a relative term ￿ a high 
degree on this scale may not necessarily imply that firms are constantly looking for, or are 
willing to exchange knowledge within an open market, but simply reflect the fact that even 
initially limited market interchanges of knowledge lead to additional exchanges, which will most 
likely consist of two-way flows of knowledge in order to support the relationships. Accordingly, 
we suggest that ￿openness￿ will be reflected in a series of bilateral exchange relationships rather 
than random interactions with firms in a population, and that openness ￿structures￿ will develop 
over time and reduce the amount of broad search and random partner selection in favor of 
established ties. This, furthermore, suggests that ￿communities of openness￿ will develop over 
time consisting of firms with repeated buy/sell transactions, but these will essentially be islands 
of strong mutual exchanges of knowledge within a sea of much lower degrees of knowledge 
interchanges. IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                            05-02-2008
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TABLE 1: BASIC STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
 
 N  Mean  Std. 
Dev  1 2 3 4 5 6  7  8  9  10 
1. Specific Partner Choice 
BUY  131  .54  .5 1                  
2. Specific Partner Choice 
SELL  131 .29  .46 0.52*** 1                 
3. Reciprocal Dealing Reported  104  .30  .46  0.28**  0.31**  1               
4. Open Innovation Reported  103  .24  .43  0.08  0.08  0.30**  1             
5. OI implied BUY  131  .82  .39  0.24**  0.13  -0.13  -0.10  1           
6. OI implied SELL  131  .24  .43  0.37*** 0.32*** 0.45***  0.22*  0.08  1         
7. OI BUY & SELL  131  .21  .41  0.32*** 0.26**  0.38***  0.17^  0.24**  0.92*** 1       
8.  Age  116  22.03 21.62 -0.04 -0.06 0.045  0.08  0.13  -0.04 0.01  1     
9. Size  127  3.17  1.51  0.07  -0.02  0.13  0.02  0.19*  0.13  0.18*  0.52*** 1   
10. R&D Intensity  122  2.16  1.53  0.15  0.15^  0.15  0.46*** -0.32** 0.30*** 0.20*  -0.19*  -0.11  1 
^<0.1, *<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001 
NOTE:  THE REPORTED CORRELATIONS FOR SIZE REFER TO THE ORIGINAL, ORDINAL VARIABLE WITH 6 LEVELS AS USED IN THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE  (SEE APPENDIX).IE Business School Working Paper                 DE8-125-I                                            05-02-2008   
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TABLE 2: DO OPEN INNOVATION FIRMS CHOOSE SPECIFIC PARTNERS? 
Models estimated with a binary logit model. Probability estimated is that of NO specific partner choice. Accordingly, negative 
parameter estimates indicate that the respective variable is associated with a higher degree of specific partner choice. 
Dep. Variable  Specific Partner Choice BUY  Specific Partner Choice SELL 












Open Innovation Reported  -.10 
(.62)  - -  -.47 
(.62)  - - 
OI implied BUY    -.88 
(.79)  -   -.50 
(.78)  - 
OI implied SELL  -  -2.07** 
(.66)  - -  -1.62** 
(.53)  - 
OI implied BUY & SELL  -  -  -1.72** 
(.64)  - -  -1.35** 
(.52) 
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TABLE 3: DO OPEN INNOVATION FIRMS BUY FROM AND SELL TO THE SAME PARTNERS? 
Models estimated with a binary logit model. Probability estimated is that of NO reciprocal 
dealing. Hence, negative parameter estimates indicate that the respective variable is associated 
with a higher degree of reciprocal dealing. 
Dep. Variable  Reciprocal Dealing Reported 






Open Innovation Reported  -1.70* 
(.67)  - - 
OI implied BUY  -  .94 
(1.01)  - 
OI implied SELL  -  -2.50*** 
(.63)  - 
OI BUY & SELL  -  -  -1.99*** 
(.58) 
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APPENDIX 
The following is an excerpt of the survey administered in late 2007 in Spain. The 
questions listed below are the primary source of data for the analysis performed in this paper. 
The remaining questions in the survey either collected simple demographic data like employee 
size, founding year etc. (questions 1 through 8), or queried other aspects of innovation practices 
that are not directly related to the specific hypotheses developed in the current paper. 
 
2. Size of the company (number of employees): 
o <10  employees  Dummy:  very small 
o  10 - 50 employees  Dummy: small 
o 50-250  employees  Dummy:  lower medium 
o  250 - 1000 employees  Dummy: medium 
o  1000 ￿ 5000 employees  Dummy: upper medium 
o >5000  employees  Dummy:  large 
 
9. How well does the in-house R&D of your company match with your technology 
requirements? 
o  Completely 
o  Sometimes we acquire external technologies 
o  The utilization of external technologies (and knowledge) is vital to our business 
 
23. In sourcing external technologies/IPR, do you usually: 
o  Work with random new partners every time? 
o  Prefer to work with a specific set of partners 
o  Always deal with the same partners 
o  Other _________________________________________________________ 
 
26. What is the extent of new technologies or intellectual property rights (IPR) that arise 
from your own R&D, but that you are not able utilize in your own business model? 
o  None 
o  ￿Surplus￿ technologies emerge unavoidably, because only a part of emerging 
technologies can be commercialized 
o  Developing of technologies and IPR for external organizations is central to our business 
model 
 
35. When you offer or sell external technologies/IPR, do you usually: 
o  Work with random new partners every time 
o  Prefer to work with a specific set of partners 
o  Always deal with the same partners 
o  Other _________________________________________________________ 
 
36. .Do you provide technology/IPR to firms from whom you source technology/IPR? 
o  No 
o  Sometimes 
o  Often 
 
42. In your opinion, are you applying the ￿open innovation￿ concept in your company? 
o  Yes 
o  No  
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NOTAS 